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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arose from respondent's clailn for money 
due and O"\V'"ing hin1 for services rendered in designing 
plans and specifications for the construction of a home 
for appellants on a lot owned by then1 at 1510 Ute Drive 
in Indian Hills Subdivision, Salt Lake City, Utah. Re-
spondent's Co1nplaint (R. 1) alleges that in Ap~il of 
1954 .appellants engaged his services as an architect and 
that coincidentally a \vritten agree1nent \vas executed; 
that in pursuance of such e1nployn1ent he entered upon 
the preparation and the execution of such necessary 
plans, specifications, and dra\Yings, requisite for the 
taking of bids by December, 1954; that the lowest hid 
\vas $G:2,579.00; that defendants \\rere obligated to pay 
a sun1 equal to G% thereof, to-\vit, $3,754.7 ±; that ap-
pellants have paid $1300.00 and a balance remains due 
and o'ving in the sum of $2,5;)-1:. 7 -t, and pray judgment 
in that amount. 
Appellants' Ans\ver and Counterclaim (R. 3) ad1uits 
engaging respondent; denies any written contract was 
entered into coincidental with such engagement but ad-
n1its signing a standard form of agreement on the 27th 
day of July, 1954, and alleges that said agreement is 
incomplete and does not totally .and completely incor-
porate the agreement of the parties. 
By way of counterclaim appellants allege that plain-
. tiff was engaged hy oral agreement to design a home for 
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appellants for a cost of work including architectural ser-
vices and the cost _of th-e land not in excess of $45,000.00; 
that on the 27th day of July, 1954, the appellant, Theo-
dore Tahtaras, signed a printed form which is incomplete 
and does not fully state the agreement between the 
parties ; that the lowest bonafide standing bid which was 
presented to appellants was in excess of $80,000.00; that 
the respondent did thereafter modify the plans reducing 
the size of the proposed structure and did thereupon 
receive new bids, the lowest of which was $73,280.00 
not inclusive of the cost of the land or the fees of the 
architect; that respondent failed in the substantial per-
forinance of his contract of employment, has failed, re-
fused and neglected to n1odify the plans to the extent 
contracted for by the parties and has altogether failed 
to perforn1 according to the tern1s of said agree1nent; 
that respondent refused to return $1300.00 which ap-
pellants had previously paid. 
l~espondent's A1nended Reply (R. 8) alleges the con-
tract in 'vri ting to be the entire .agreen1ent; that ap-
pellants orally authorized respondent to design for then1 
n residence silnilar in size and ~tyle to respondent's 
house .and they approved preliluinary dra\vings as to size 
and style of residence: that all prior oral understandings 
were reduced to "~ri ting by the execution of the "~ritten 
<~on tract on or about J-uly· :27, 1954; tltat there was no 
agreen1ent orally or in writing that the total cost of the 
honse, inelncli11A' architeetnral services and eo~t of land, 
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\vas to he a stun not in excess of $45,000.00; that no 
fixed 1naximmn was set by the appellants with the re-
spondent in their negotiations; that respondent had 
fully perfor1ned; that the bid in the sum of $73,280.00 
was in excess o'f the fair and reasonable cost of con-
struction and alleges that the su1n of $1300.00 was paid 
pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the contract, which requires 
25% of the fee to be paid .at con1pletion of preliminary 
sketches. 
Appellants denied these allegations. 
During trial the Court directed respondent to file 
an additional cause in quantum meruit and admitted evi-
dence of estirnates of reasonable costs and the reason. 
ahle value of respondent's services, (R. 118, 120, and R. 
175, Lns. 1-16). 
Respondent's version, as extracted from his testi-
Inony, is substantially: 
Appellants were friendly neighbors of the respon-
dent for a period of ten years and are the owners of a 
small restaur.ant on West 3rd South Street in Salt Lake 
City, comprising 14 stools and 4 booths wherein appel-
lant Theodore Tahtaras works one shift daily as cook 
and appellant Josephine Tahtaras works part time as 
a w.aitress (R. 152, Lns. 3-16). That respondent knew 
this and also that the restaurant was the principal source 
of appellants' inco1ne ( R. 164, Ln s. 24-26). 
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In April, 1954, he was called to advise appellants 
on choice of available lots and in the latter part of the 
month (R. 23, 24, Lns. 30-3) he was orally retained to 
draw plans and specifications for a dwelling to be built 
on the lot of his.reco1nn1endation (R. 143, 144, Lns. 28-2), 
the home to be as beautiful, as good and as nice as the 
home of the respondent which appellants had visited a 
number of times and for which they had repeatedly ex-
pressed admiration (R. 25, 26, Lns. 11-11) and which 
cost respondent $62,000.00, containing 1100 square feet 
of patio (R. 49, Lns. 5-10), 2240 square feet of house, 
and 500 square feet of garage (oral stipulation). 
Pursuant to such authorization and en1ployment the 
respondent on or about May 11, 1954, presented his topo-
graphical survey of the property ( R .. 27, Lns. 18-21) and 
received tl}e instructions (R. 28, Lns. 1-12) fro1n ap-
pellants that the house \vas to eontain three bedroon1s 
on the 1nain floor, co1nbined living roon1 and dining roon1, 
breakfast roon1 off the kitchen, utility roon1 upstairs, a 
t\vo-car garage and a co1npleted recreation roon1 do\vn-· 
stairs (R. 28, Lns. 1-6) and t\vo bathroo1ns (R. 30, Ijns. 
9-13). 
In the latter part of ~fay or first part of June lH~ 
presented -rough sehen1atirs, rough dra,vings to scale 
(1~. 29, Lns. 9-17) to appellants (Exhibits 4 and 6) and 
reeeived their .acceptance and approval (R. 32, Lns. 2-18) 
and ( R. 35, Lns. 1-18). 
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At a fourth 1neeting about a week later he presented 
these exhibits to appellants again together with a floor 
plan to scale (I~xhihit 5) CR. 3-t, Lns. 1-17). 
At this n1eeting the schematic sketches and floor 
plan, Exhibits 4, 6, and 5 'vere approved by appellants 
(R. 35, Lns. 7-27). 
On July 27, 1954, .at a fifth Ineeting respondent sub-
Initted preli1ninaries to appellants at their rented resi-
dence (R. 36, 37, Lns. 30-1) - prelilninaries being draw-
ings essentially id~ntical with the approved schematics 
but in addition had elevation and extensions so that the 
appearance of the house could be visualized, Exhibit 7 
(R. 37, Lns. 4-28); these 'vere approved and respondent 
received frou1 appellants a check for $300.00. On that 
date appellant Theodore Tahtaras signed the written 
ele1i1ents of the agreement, :mxhibit 1, which is a printed 
form prepared by the American Institute of Architects, 
and subn1itted by the respondent, which provides: 
1. The architect shall prepare plans .and specifica-
tions and supervise. 
2. Be paid 8% of the Cost of the Work, the said 
percentage being.called the Basic Rate, and 
3. Receive a su1n equal to 25% of the Basic Rat~ 
co1nputed upon a reasonable estimated cost upon com-
pletion of preliminary studies, and 
-t. Further payrnent fro1n time to tilne so that the 
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architect shall have received 75% of the Basic Rate at 
the con1pletion of the general working drawings and 
specifications. 
5. To be computed upon a reasonable cost estimated 
-on such completed drawings and specifications or if bids 
had been received then computed upon the lowest bona 
. fide bid or bids. 
6. If any work designed is abandoned or suspended 
in whole or in part, the architect should be paid for tl1P. 
service rendered on account· of it. 
7. Cost of the work is defined as the cost to the 
owner, but such cost shall not include any architect's or 
special consultant's fees or reiinburseinents or the cost 
of the clerk of the work. 
At this point respondent could have "guesstimated" 
work at something in excess of $60,000.00 but did not 
see fit to do so because of the stipulation of designed 
work-so1nething as beautiful and as attractive as hi3 
home (R. 150, 151, Lns. 1-1). 
Nothing in the printed form would indicate its in-
tent to provide for the lilnitation of a proposed cost of 
the work and the respondent contends that to this point 
there ""as no conversation bet""een the parties \Yhich 
deter1nined for hhn such a li1nitation. 
About September lOth he subn1itted Exhibit 8, 
( whieh are sketches of the interior details, (R. 41, 42. 
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I.jns .. 7 -1~) and at \vhich tiu1e he conHidered hilnself ap-
proved on all items of interior or exterior details (R. 42, 
Lns. 23-28) of a house 'vi th a square footage of 4500 
Rquare feet (R. 71, Lns. 16-22). 
Appellant Josephine Tahtaras volunteered the ques-
tion that this house \vould cost at least $60,000.00 and 
respondent replied , "Yes, at least that and more." (R. 
4-l-, 45, I_Jns. 30-13) and appellant Theodore Tahtaras said 
in order to give his 'vife exactly what she wanted, he 
"rould go as high as $65,000.00 {R. 45, Lns. 1-13). 
After this alleged convers.ation respondent pro7 
ceeded to draw final plans and specifications, a pro-
cedure \vhich involved the next two months and further 
conferences \vith appellants (R. 47, Lns. 2-7) and work 
involving Exhibit 17 - working studies and preliminary 
engineering, and most of the necessary work prior to 
rxecuting the completed documents (R. 72, Lns. 6-18). 
l~espondent testified there was rio conversation about 
lilniting the cost of the work other than the one respon-
dent recited .above as having taken place on or about 
Neptember 10th ( R. 28, Ln. 28, R. 32, Lns. 2-6, R. 35, 
Lns. 28-30, R. 36, Ln. 1, and R. 39, Lns. 24-27). 
After co1npleted plans and specifications for a house 
of 4500 square feet had bren approved by appellants, 
bids \Vere in vi ted. 
Those received were: (Exhibit 14) 
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Earl Belknap ················-······-·--·--------$62,589.00 
Stewart L. Carlson ------------------------ 80,562.00 
I-Iamer Culp Jr. ---------------------------- 82,500.00 
A.lvin E. Fors ---------------------------------- 92,500.00 
but the bid by Mr. Belknap was immediately withdrawn; 
that appellants had no knowledge of Belknap's bid prior 
to its withdrawal (R. 67, Lns. 25-29). 
Appellants protested the bid prices including the 
figure of $62,589.00 (Belknap's bid, R. 73, 74, Lns. 30-7) 
and after some discussion respondent offered to revis~ 
plans, knowing that appellants \Vanted a figure below 
$62,589.00, by cutting them to see where they would co1ne 
out (R. 72-78, R. 56, Lns. 6-10, R. 153, 154, Lns. 21-2). 
That the reasonable estimate of cost is $12 to $14 per 
square foot, (R. 174, Lns. 21-23). 
With the consent of the appellants to cut plans (R. 
72-78, Lns. 25-28) respondent proceeded to cut 700 feet 
from the structure ( R. 71, 72, Lns. 16-5) and sent out. 
invitations for bids "Tithout first obtaining acceptance 
or approval by appellants to the n1odifications (R. 56, 
Lns. 11-15 and R. 69, Lns. 17 -:2-!) and thereafter sub-
Ini tted bids of $73,280.00 and $75,987.00 on the 3800 foot 
' -~trueture to the appellants. At this point respondent 'vas 
not asked nor did he offer to rebuild or design new plans 
for a house (R. 158, Lns. 1-12). 
Appellants thereupon abandoned the contract and 
returned plans to respondent because they said they \vere 
fa(le<l 'vith t\vo la'v suits at the thne and could not con-
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tinue 'vith construction (R. 1G9, Lns. 15-29). 
Appellants had paid a total of $1300.00 in two·p.ay-
Inents (ad1nitted by pleadings). 
Appellants' version, as extracted fro1n their testi-
nlony is substantially: 
On August 29, 1953, appellants entered into an agree-: 
1nent, Exhibit 21, (R~ 238, 239, Lns. 28-8) to purchase 
.a lot in Indian Hills, which previously at their request 
had been selected for them by respondent, (R. 79, Lns. 
17-30 and R. 23, 24, Lns. 11-3). That about the lOth of 
June, 1954, after entering into negotiations to sell their 
residence, (Exhibit 22) appellants orally contracted with 
respondent to design a house on the Ute Drive lot.· 
':'Phat appellants and respondent went to the. Ute 
Drive lot in Indian Hills (R. 243, Lns. 1-4) and after 
appellant Josephine Tahtaras told him the rooms she 
\vanted in the house, and their respective locations relat-
ing to vie,v, the respondent asked appellant Theodore 
Tahtaras how Inuch he ·wanted to spend (R. 270, Lns. 
15-21 and R. 243, Lns. 26-30). Appellant Theodore Tah-
taras answered, "$40,000 . bec.ause by the time I get 
through, the cost of the lot and your fee will run around 
$45,000 to $47,500." 
In the course of a series of rneetings appellants were 
shown and approved various stages of the work, pairl 
t\vo installments totalling $1300.00, signed the written 
elements of the contract on ,July 27, 1954, and ultimately 
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the parties convened in respondent's office on or about 
the 14th of December, 1954, at which time appellants ob-
served all the bids and were notified of the withdrawal 
of the Belknap bid of $62,589.00. Appellants declared 
their disapproval of the size of the bids, and their de-
sire to forget the whole thing (R. 281, 282 Lns. 25-8 
and R. 258, Lns. 17-22). 
Respondent offered to cut about 500 square feet 
(Exhibit 13) to bring amount to appellants' figure (R. 
282, Lns. 9-26). 
The appellants, at the persuasion of respondent, 
consented to cutting the size of house about 500 square 
feet; the elimination of a substantial amount of detail 
on the lo,ver floor, the cutting of the size of recreation 
room, by partitioning off a sewing roon1 and the ad-
' dition of one-half bathroo1n fixtures to a roughed-in 
lower floor bathroo1n, Exhibit 11-3R, 4R, 13R (R. 282, 
283, Lns. 27-30). 
The appellant Theodore Tahtaras called Earl Belk-
nap, the $62,589.00 bidder, and tried to persuade hin1 to 
rebid the plans (R. 294, 295, Lns. 22-12) telling hin1 there 
1night be son1e revisions (R. 30-!, 305, Lns. 10-10). 
When the second bids can1e back respondent talked 
to appellant .Josephine rl~nhtaras by phone and on learn-
ing the bid~ \vere over $73,000.00 she told hhu they 
couldn't afford it and would be better off a-oin()' out to 0 0 
buy one. 
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The arehi teet ans\vPred, ·'I think you'd better." (R. 
260, Lns. 15-25). 
Appellants deny specifically that they participated 
in a ·conversation at any tin1e where 1frs. Tahtaras had 
estiniated building costs at $GO,OOO or that Mr. Tahtaras 
had declared a \\rillingness to spend $65,000 (R. 279, 
I~ns. 3-19). 
That about the 1niddle of January, 1955, appellant 
rrheodore Tahtaras, in the office of respondent, discussed 
the second set of bids \vhich \V(·re $73,280.00 and $75,-
987.00 (R. 286, 287, Lns. 30-15) and appellant told hiin 
to forget the \vork. Respondent ans,vered, "I can't build 
you a ho1ne for less than $GO,OOO.OO," and demanded th~ 
halance of his fee. 
Appellant refused to pay (R. 288, Lns. 1-4) and on 
.January 26, 1955, bought ·a home already constructed. · 
~~~he Court in line \vith it~ reasoning expressed at 
the trial ( 1~. 320, Lns. 3-8) made its decision (Minute 
Entry - R. 3~-!) ; holding defendant e1nployed plaintiff 
to design plans for .a figure of $65,000 less architect's 
fees or $G0,18G.18; "plaintiff could have cut plans to get 
hids of this figure, but defendant abandoned project. 
])efendants not entitled to return of any fees paid; plain .. 
tiff entitled to judgment calculated on quantum meruit" 
and con1puted the saine as followR: 
"Fee if work had been completed 8% of 
62,579.00 is 5207.12 reduced to maxi-
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mum of 8% on 60,185.18 or .................... 4814.82 
Less tt4 allocated to building supervi-
Sion ··---------·······-... ------ ... ---- ... ----------------------·-----·· 1203.70 
Less Ys allocated to reducing plans to 
secure bids at 60,185.18............................ 601.85 
Less amount paid ------------····---------·------·-···-·· 1300.00 
1709.27 
(R. 324)." 
Findings (R. 13 and 14) were made that appellants 
engaged respondent to draw plans and specifications for 
a home the cost of the work to be $65,000 including 
architect's fees or $60,185.18; that the \vritten contract 
did not fully encompass all of the understandings and 
contracts made by the parties; that bids were taken by 
plaintiff for the convenience of the defendants, the said 
bids ranging fro1n $73,500 to $90,000, -but plaintiff \va-s 
ready, willing and able to reduce the dimensions and 
design so as to procure bids of $60,185.18; that not,vith-
standing the willingness and ability of plaintiff to 
further 1nodify the drawings and specifications, defend-
ants on January 14, 1955, notified plaintiff of their in-
tention to abandon, and they did in fact abandon their 
projected construction and did not erect the residence 
designed by plaintiff or any residence on said lot; that 
the reasonable v.alue of plaintiff's services is $3009.27 and 
plaintiff is entitled to that su1n less $1300.00 paid or a 
balance of $1709.27 \vhich sun1 \Va~ payable on or be-
fore February 1, 1955. 
Appellants 1noved for a ne\V trial (R. 328) and the 
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said 1notion "\vas denied (R. 329). 
STA~rENIENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
DURING TRIAL THE COURT ERRED IN (a) INTRO-
DUClNG THE ISSUE OF QUANTUM MERUIT; (b) PER-
MITTING EVIDENCE TO BE ADiviiTTED IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF; (c) ALLOWING AMENDMENT OF THE COM-
PLAINT; (d) MAKING FINDING NO. 7 THAT REASON-
ABLE VALUE OF RESPONDENT'S SERVICES IS $3009.27; 
(e) ENTERING JUDGMENT THEREON; (f) DENYING AP-
PELLANTS RECOVERY OF THE SUM OF $1300.00. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT, HAVING FOUND THAT THE COST OF 
THE WORK HAD BEEN STIPULATED AT THE INCEPTION 
OF THE ORAL CONTRA.CT, ERRED IN FINDING THE 
FIGURE WAS $60,185.18 AS SET FORTH IN FINDINGS 
OF FACT NUMBERED 4 AND 6 RATHER THAN THE SUM 
OF $40,000.00 AS TESTIFIED TO BY APPELLANTS. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING (a) THAT THE 
BIDS TAKEN BY THE PLAINTIFF RANGED FROM $73,-
500 TO $90,000 AND (b) THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS 
READY WILLING AND ABLE TO CUT THE PLANS TO 
$60,185.18. 
POINT IV. 
AN ARCHITECT OWES TO HIS ·CLIENT A FIDUCIARY 
DUTY OF LOYALTY AND GOOD FAITH. 
POINT V. 
THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT ARE INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE ·CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF 
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THE COURT.; TO THE CONTRARY, THE SAID FINDINGS 
REQUIRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE APPELLANTS ON THEIR A~ISVvER AND. COUN-
TERCLAIM. WE SUBMIT THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
SHOULD BE REVERSED AND JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE 
OF ACTION SHOULD BE ENTERED ON PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT AND FOR APPELLANTS ON THEIR COUN-
TERCLAIM. 
1\RGUl\fENT 
POINT I. 
DURING TRIAL THE COURT ERRED IN (a) INTRO-
DUCING THE ISSUE OF QUANTUM MERUIT; (b) PER-
MITTING EVIDENCE TO BE ADMITTED IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF; (c) ALLOWING AMENDMENT OF THE COlVI-
PLAINT; (d) MAKING FINDING NO. 7 THAT REASON-
ABLE VALUE OF RESPONDENT'S SERVICES IS $3009.27; 
(e) ENTERING JUDGMENT THEREON; (f) DENYING AP-
PELLANTS RECOVERY OF THE SUM OF $1300.00. 
(a) .and (c) violate R~ule 15 (h) of lT tah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(b) Ad1nission of testimony in support of a cause 
1n quantun1 1ueruit is i1n1naterial and irrelevant 'vhere 
it is in defeasanee of the tern1s of an express contract. 
(d) The 1neasure of respondent's dan1ages in quan-
tuJn 1ueruit is set forth in the court's decision (R. 8:2-l:). 
Thr. court first Inultiplied $60,185.00 "rhich it had 
detern1ined to be the pre-stated li1nitntion on the cost 
of the \YOrk by the contr.actural Basic R.a.te, nalnely s:;~. 
It thPn reduced this result by 1/~ because of build--
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ing suspension, and an additional Vs 'vhich was allocated 
as the reasonable value of the work necessary in re-
ducing the plans further to secure bids consistent with 
the pre:.stated limitation. 
This conclusion j s not merely not borne out by 
the evidence in that the ljg reduction is absolutely arbit-
rary- \vithout a scintilla of evidence to support it- but 
is in direct conflict with respondent's contention that he 
"exceeded in service value 1nore than the contract 
a1nount" (R. 176, Lns. 10-26). 
Counsel 1nost seriously questions the prerogative of 
the court summarily to evaluate the failure of respon-
dent's performance to Ys of his fee. 
Even if this Vs was amenable to 1neasurement, the 
crux of the issue here is \vhether the performance of 
respondent is to be 1neasured by his work at the dra,ving 
hoard, or hy the substantive result of his cutting an addi-
tional 1000 feet ( $12.00-$14.00 per foot, see Statement 
of Facts) front the size of the house regardless of the 
desires of the appellants. 
(e) Judgment in quantum meruit in this case is con-
trarY" to law. Both parties insisted an express contract 
existed between them, and the court so found. 
By the court's st.aten1ent- (R. 118, 119, 120): 
COURT: "It is my idea right now in the case 
you have to recover on the quanturn meruit. -
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It looks like now I would think quantum meruit 
would be your basis, in other words reasonable 
value to date, not exceeding probably a certain 
sum-" 
MR. ROSE: I take it Your Honor feels there 
is a basis for recovery in this action on quantum 
meruit~ 
COURT: I think if there is any it would be 
on tltat basis. If the contract had been perfor1ned 
it probably \vould not be the basis for recovery. 
- We have the plaintiff's story- That they were 
stopped in the middle of their work, and when 
that occurs quantum meruit is usually the basis 
for damages, not the amount of the contract -" 
Counsel for appellants disagrees. If respondent can 
recover at all, he n1ust do so on the express contract 
made by the parties. He eannot, where he has failed to 
perform, or been guilty of breach, avail hin1self of the 
device of quantun1 n1eruit to recover for his unused and 
unuseable efforts. One who breaches an express con-
tract should not be per1nitted to circun1vent his respons-
ibilities thereunder or avoid the onus of hi~ breaeh, but 
retain its benefits through the 1uediun1 of iluplied con-
tract. 
Where there is an express contract nothing is to be 
i1nplied, except as n1ay be construed fro1n the agree1nents 
expressed. 
(f) It follows that if respondent is not entitled to 
reeover on quantun1 IHPtuit, he cannot r~tnin the $1300.00 
paid hiln by the appellants. 
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In Jfaack v. Schneider- 57 ~[o. App. 431 where 
$200.00 had been paid on aecount to the architect, the 
court declared at Page 433: 
"If this be true it is difficult to see - the 
plaintiff had any rause of action .against the de-
fendant. Taking plaintiff's evidence to be true, 
it left plaintiff in receipt of $200.00 to which he 
had no legal claim." 
If respondent's version of the transaction between 
hin1 and appellants is to be believed, and if under the 
circtnnstances he \vas entitled to a recovery in quantun1 
1neruit, then he could conceivably recover for work only 
to the date of Septe1nber lOth when, according to hiln, 
appellants committed themselves to an expenditure up 
to $65,000. He could not recover for work thereafter 
which was (respondent's testimony) - "The procedure 
\Vhich involved additional conferences with appellants 
(1~. 47, Lns. 2-7) and work involving Exhibit 17 which 
is working studies .and preliminary engine~ring and most 
of the necessary work prior to executing the completed 
docun1ents" ( R. 72, I_jns. 6-18) and also the completed 
documents. 
This work led to bids in excess of $80,000. There is 
no evidence of the value of respondent's work to that date 
and therefore he must fail of recovery. 
The follo,ving cases elearly support appellants' 
position: In Pack v. Wines (l'"tah 1914) 141 Pac. 105 
Justice Straup in his concurring opinion on page 107 
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declares: 
"But since he made a bid 'vhich 'vas not 
satisfactory and not acceptable to the defendants, 
therefore he asserts he now is entitled to be paid. 
But that is not his contract. No such condition is 
specified or embraced within it. 'Vhen the parties, 
as here, made a contract specifying conditions 
under which the plaintiff was to receive no conl-
pensations, and conditions under which he was 
to be paid, to no"\v permit him to recover on other 
conditions not specified is to make another con~ 
tract for the1n, or to permit a recovery on an iln-
plied contract. I think we may do neither. 
In Graham v. Bell Irving (1907 Wash.) 91 Pac. 8, Plain-
tiff architect was to receive a fee eqllal to 2¥2 percent 
of the lo,vest or accepted bid, as the case nright be, for 
services silnilar to those of respondent in the instant 
. ...... 
case. A cost of construction lilnit was stip-ulated at 
$25,000 but the lowest bid was $35,000. Defendant coun-
terclaimed for $300 paid prior to the receipt of the bid. 
The court declared : 
"lT nder such facts there 'vas a plain failure 
to prepare plans that 'vould con1e \Yithin the liini-
tations of the construction cost fixed by respon-
dent, a straight breach of the contract. Appellant 
is therefore not entitled to recover upon the con-
tract, and he is no n1ore entitled to recover upon 
a quantun1 1neruit. Respondent has neither ac-
eepted nor received any benefits fron1 appellant's 
work, and he offered to fully return the plans. 
It is argued that the respondent~s payn1ent of 
$:~00.00 on aceount of thP plans ::uuounted to an 
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IN THE SUPREr\1E COURT OF THE STArr'E OF UfJ.\\H 
LOWELL E. PARRISH, : 
Plaintiff and Respondent, INSERTION OF 
-vs- : .ADDITIONAL illJ-
THEODORE H. TAHTARAS, and COVERED CASES 
JOSEPHINE T.~HTA RA.S, : ON BEHALF OF 
Defendants and Appellants. APPELLANTS. 
:Case No. 8514 
-----------------------------
The following two cases are to be inserted 
on Page 19 of Appellants' 3rief immediately 
following quotation from Pack v. Wines (Utah 
1914) in support of appellants' proposition 
as set forth in Point I of the said Brief. 
In Morris· v. Russell, et ux 120 Utah 546; 
236 Pacific (2nd) 451, Mr. Crockett declares 
as dictum: 
... 
"It may be true that where parties 
allege the same express contract, 
it is improper to submit the case 
to the jury on quantum meruit." 
Taylor v. Royle 1 Utah (2nd) 175 
Deals primarily with the matter of quantum 
meruit proof where the complaint alleged an 
express contract employment, and the Court 
decided that it was improper to have awarded 
a quantum meruit judgment. 
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acceptance. ']~he pa)ylnent was n1ade before it had 
been de1nonstrated by the bids that the planR 
would not n1eet the require1nents of the contract 
in the rnatter of cost· of construction. It was a 
vayn1ent rnade upon account, somewhat hastily 
perhaps, but undPr the eiretnnstances it was not 
an act 'vhich hound respondent to an acceptance 
of the plans." 
The court further held that sinee appellee. did not 
appeal for return of the $300.00 it would not rule on 
the n1atter. 
In Kurfiss v. Jf nrtin 110 S. W. 33 nlissouri 1908 in the 
syllabus note 2 on page 32, the court declare.d :· 
"22. San1e -·Quantum Meruit. 
"An .arehitect agreeing to furnish plans for 
a building, the cost not to exceed a specified 
. a1noun·t,. who fails to co1nply 'vith his contract, 
in that the building would cost in excess of that 
a1nount, is not entitled to recover on a quantum 
meruit." 
And further at the hotto1n of the second colun1n on page 
33, declares: 
"~Judging by defendant's contention, he is 
laboring under the supposition that the court tried 
the case upon the theory that, although plaintiff 
had failed to comply with his contract in the first 
instance, he would Le entitled to recover on quan-
turn n1eruit for the services rendered under the 
contraet. lf this supposition is true, ·the court 
was in error. A party c.annot recover for the 
reasonable value of his services rendered in 
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cases of contracts of this kind unless he had hiin-
self complied with its terms." 
In Cooper v. City of Derby 75 Atl. 140 (Conn. 1910) the 
Court stated on Page 141, column 1: 
"He therefore could not complain that they 
were not accepted. Nor can he recover upon a 
quantum meruit. No plans were wanted, or would 
have been of service, 'vhich called for n1ore money 
than the co1nmittee could contract to pay. His did. 
The limit of cost 'vas brought to his attention first 
by the board of education, and then by the coin-
rnittee. His estilnates, submitted to them in re-
sponse, proved to be incorrect. .Lt\..n architect enl-
ployed to plan a building to c.ost $20,000, does not 
fulfill the terms of his engagement by planning 
one that costs $30,000. His employer may be 
ready to incur the additional expense, and to 1nake 
use of the plans. He may also decline to make 
any use of then1. This the city did in the case at 
bar." 
Zannoth v. Booth Radio Stations 52 N. \V·. (2d) 678 
(1\fieh. 1952) states on l:>age 682: 
" (2, 3) It is the rule in I\!ichigan that an 
architect 1nust stay "Tithin the cost set by the 
o'vner, even though such co8t "Tas not set out in 
the written contract bet,veen the parties.'' 
This case is 1uore fully discussed later in this brief. 
In II elln11.tth v. Benoist 129 S. \V·. 257 (~Iissouri 1910) 
in a sinlilar type of <'H8t~ the court in denying the architect 
rPeovPry on a quantun1 1ueruit in the second colunm of 
page 258 stated : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
"Contention is u1.ade by plaintiff that this is 
an action upon quantu1n 1neruit for services ren-
dered. While this is true as far as the amount of 
his recovery is coneerned, yet his pleading as-
serts a contract of en1ploy1nent which was corn-
plete except as to the price to be paid; his con-
tention being that the payn1ent for the services 
to be rendered \vas to be their reasonable v.alue, 
and \vas not dependent upon any condition. The 
contention of defendant is that the contract of 
elnploynlent was conditioned that he should 
furnish plans for a house not to cost rnore than 
$10,000, and that this being the contract, and plain-
tiff having failed to furnish plans for such a 
house, he cannot recover. It see1ns clear to us that 
this testilnony as to \vhat the terms of the con-
tract \vere \vas admissible· under a general denial. 
It does not assert a different employment or a 
different contract from that pleaded by plaintiff, 
but it was offered for the purpose of showing 
that the contract pleaded by plaintiff was never, 
in fact made, and hence goes to defeat plaintiff's 
cause of action entirely." 
POINT II. 
THE ·COURT, HAVING FOUND THAT THE COST OF 
THE '\VORK HAD BEEN STIPULATED AT THE INCEPTION 
OF THE ORAL CONTRACT, ERRED IN FINDING THE 
FIGURE WAS $60,185'.18 AS SET FORTH IN FINDINGS 
OF FACT NUMBERED 4 AND 6 RATHER THAN THE SUM 
OF $40,000.00 AS TESTIFIED TO BY APPELLANTS. 
Appellants contend that at the time of engaging 
the services of respondent he asked and they told him 
the)· \Vere 'villing to spend $40,000 for construction; that 
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they figured to spend $45,000 to $47,000, including 
architect's fee and cost of the land. 
Respondent contend's he was engaged under a 
stipulation of the designed "rork-son1ething as beautiful 
and as attractive as his ho1ne (R. 150, Lns. 18-25) -and 
not· until 41j2 months after he was engaged under that 
stipulation and had received approval and acceptance 
·.of his work in both interior and exterior detail did one 
-appellant volunteer a guess on. the cost of the construc-
·tiori, and the other volunteer a cornmittn1ent on what he· 
!vould spend; namely $65,000; that tllis committment ''Tas 
. • I, 
_1nad~ six>\veeks after appellants l1ad. signed the 'vritten 
portion .of the contract. 
The Court at close of trial declared: (R. 320, Lns. 
3-8): 
''It is very apparent that a person listening 
to the evidence would find it hard to i1nagine that 
the plaintiff would do all of the work he did, with-
out being told as to 'vhat price range he was to 
·do· it in. It is also hard for a person to ilnagine 
that the defendant would hire an architect to do 
such work without giving hiln a price range." 
The Decision ( R. 32-l-) and Findings ( R. 13 and 1-1) 
strike a con1pro1nise to thr effect that a lhnitation 8perify-
ing the inclusion of the n rchitect's fee "·.as set before the 
work \Vas begun (but not the cost of the land) and deter-
Inine thP figure to be the one recited hy the architect 
aH having been stipulated 4% 1nonths later. 
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The finding see1ns obviously inconsistent in that it 
seeks to reconcile the irreconcilable. 
If it \Vas the opinion of the court that a lin1itation 
was made at the very outset, then it can only be the 
figure contended for by .appellants, for appellants' iR 
the only figure testified to at this ti1ne. 
A contract must be construed from the perspective 
of the parties at the tin1e of entering into the contract 
and if one contends for one unusual in the common ex-
perience of n1an, then he n1ust prove such a contract 
clearly and convincingly. 
CoornlJs v. Beede, 1896, 89 1\le. 187, 36 A. 104 56 A1n. 
St. Rep. 406 declares: 
"Of course, it would be too much to say that 
parties could not make such a shadowy contr.act 
as the defense contends for, but it would be so 
strange and unusual a thing to do, that clear and 
convincing evidence should be required to prove 
•t " l . 
:\ denial of appellant's testin1ony, and the propound-
ing of respondent's story, which in and of itself is un-
usual, is hardly such cle.ar and convincing proof. It 
seen1s hardly reasonable that at the time of entering into 
the \vritten portion of the agree1nent, at which tilne the 
floor plan and perspectives had been con1pleted by the 
respondent and approved by the appellants (the point 
'vhere the minds of the parties Inet on the size and the 
uppe.arance of the house} the appellants \vould not have 
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expressed some curiosity about the cost of the house. 
It is much more likely that they would not have bound 
themselves to the written terms unless they knew a pre-
stipulated cost limitation was in1pressed upon it. 
At the point where respondent presented the written 
form for signature, it was incumbent upon him to have 
informed the appellants of his "guesstimate." It is 
probable that he did not do so because he was aware of 
the cost li1nitation imposed upon hin1, and intended to 
abide it. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING (a) THAT THE. 
BIDS TAKEN BY THE PLAINTIFF RANGED FROM $73,-
500 TO $90,000 AND (b) THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS 
READY WILLING AND ABLE TO CUT THE PLANS TO 
$60,185.18. 
The best argtnnent supporting Point III is respon-
den'ts own testimony: 
(a) and (b) The bids received after first invitation 
# 
to bid were : $62,589.00; $80,562.00; $82,500.00 ~ $92,500.00 
(Exhibit 1±) and the $62,589.00 bid \\Tas withdra,vn be-
fore appellants were infor1ned of it. (R. 67, Lns. 25-29). 
J?lans 'vere cut 700feet in size, .a substantial a1nount 
of dPtail 'vas eliluinated and bids returned at $73,280.00 
and $75,987.00. By a ronsistent course of conduct estab-
lished by respondent's repeated submission to appellants 
of the plans during their various forn1a tiYe stages and 
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the approval .and acceptance by ~hem of the san1e, the 
parties determined respondent's performance to be a set 
of plans specific in size and detail at a stipulated price. 
'ralid hids for the construc-tion of this house ranged 
fron1 $80,5G2.00 to $92,500.00. 
Respondent kno\ving appellants' desire to spend a 
figure less than $62,500.00 offered to cut plans to see 
\vhere they \vould cou1e out. He cut, but plans didn't 
co1ne out even close to .appellants' known desires in price 
(R. 72-78): 
"Q. And you assumed the responsibility then of 
shrinking this house to get a substantial cut 
on the figure of $62,500 did you not~ 
A. The $62,500 figure \vas out of the total. It 
\vasn't on any figures. It was a resubmittal 
on the basis of reduced size of drawings. 
Q. And you suggested that you revise it to cut 
do\vn under the $62,500 figure~ 
- 1\. I did not suggest I do that at all. I suggested 
I cut the drawings - cut out the amount of 
building and see where it would come in at. 
Q. -y· ou knew, however, they wanted the figure 
of $62,500 cut, did you not~ 
A. Yes, they said that, but you cannot al\vays 
take a client at his word. He always wants 
to save money. 
TIIE COURT: Mr. Parrish, you knew they want-
ed sornething less than $62,500 ~ 
A. I didn't promise they could have it. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
THE COURT: In view of what they said about 
the size of the bid~ 
A. I knew they would want it for as little as 
they could get it. 
THE COURT: You knew they wanted it for less 
than $62,500. 
A. I don't know, you would have to ask the1n." 
(R. 72-78) 
At a conference between all of the parties after the 
bids of $73,280 and $75,987 had been received: (R. 158, 
Lns. 5-12) 
"Q. In any case you refused to redesign the house 
that 'vould bring then1 (the costs) down~? 
A. I did not refuse, I was not asked, but I did 
not refuse. 
Q. I am asking you did you offer to rebuild or 
redesign the new plans for a house. 
A. I did not offer." 
Despite this testin1ony the court found respondent 
ready, willing and able to cut plans. 
POINT I\T. 
AN ARCHITECT OWES TO HIS ·CLIENT A FIDUCIARY 
DUTY OF LOYALTY AND GOOD FAITH. 
This staten1ent in Paln1er rs. Bro·zcn et al. 273 Pae. 
(2d) 306 (Cal. 1954) states succinctly a principle of la'v 
irresponsibly violated hy respondent. Respondent under-
took to design a house for a husband and .n \vife ,vho 
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(respondent kne\v) O\vned a 14-stool 4-booth restaurant 
in \vhich hushand \vorked one shift daily as a cook, the 
\vife \vorked part ti1ne as a \vaitress and which \Vas the 
principal source of incon1e for them. 
]{(·svondent elai1ns no greater stipulated lilnitation 
upon hin1 than '"as heautiful and as attr.active as his 
hou1e. '' In perforn1ing his function the respondent 
created neither silnilar size, cost, quality, nor silnilar de-
~ign. ll1s testintony denies any effort to reproduce 
sin1ilar size, eost, or design. (R. 92-96) Similar quality 
is refuted by the fact that his own house cost $17 - $20 
per square foot whereas he testified to $12 - $14 per 
square foot as the estimated cost of the ho1ne designed 
for the appellants. 
There can be no doubt that respondent knew of his 
failure of performance in terrn~ of cost limitation, be-
cause upon receiving the first bids he undertook to cut 
the size of the plans at least one week prior to informing 
appellants of thern (R. 152, Lns. 23-28). With the con-
sent of the appellants to cut plans, knowing their dis-
satisfaction \vith the figure of $62,500, respondent with 
a total disregard of their expressed dissatisfaction "cut 
the plans to see \vhere they \vould come out" because 
'"you cannot al\v.ays take a client at his \Vords; he always 
\vants to save 1noney." (R. 61, Lns. 11-14). 
Respondent further ignored the responsibility of his 
fiduriary relationship \vhen after cutting 700 feet from 
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the size of the first-agreed -upon dwelling, eliminating 
substantial detail and rnaking 1nodifications on the base-
ment layout, he did not see fit to submit these to. appel-
lants for their approval. Yet in every formulative stage 
of his work prior to this he considered it a part of liis 
responsibility to seek their approval and acceptance. lie 
excuses himself because of the pressure of time yet he 
did not feel pressed to notify appellants of the receipt 
of bids for a period of at least a \Veek after their re-
ceipt. 
Respondent further disregarded the responsibility of 
his trust \vhen he did not see fit to caution appellant~ 
of the probable cost at the ti1ne he sought to bind then1 
to a \Vritten contract and at which time he could have 
"g·uesstiln.ated" its cost to be in excess of $60,000. 
In response to questioning \Yhy he did not caution 
the1n he ans,vered (R. 150, Lns. 22-25) 
''A. Caution ·w·as not the \Yord required. I did 
not caution the1n and I did not feel it was 
incumbent upon 1ne to caution the1n, because 
the stipulations of designed work, something 
as attractive and as beautiful as 1ny ho1ne-" 
POINT, .... 
THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT ARE INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE COURT; TO THE CONTRARY, THE SAID FINDINGS 
REQUIRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE APPELLANTS ON THEIR ANSWER AND COUN-
TERCLAIM. WE SUBMIT THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
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SHOULD BE REVERSED AND JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE 
OF ACTION SHOULD BE ENTERED ON PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT AND FOR APPELLANTS ON THEIR COUN-
TERCLAil\f. 
The gener.al proposition of la'v relating to the pay-
ment of architect's fees where the bid exceeded the 
architect's estilnate or the o\vner's limitation is stated 
\vith approbation in ll' illiar v. Nagle, et al, (Md. 1908 
71 Atl. 427. An excerpt, as it applies fully in point to 
the instant case, declares: 
"6 Cyc. 30, 'that a person employed as an 
architect to furnish a plan is entitled to remunera-
tion therefor, if made in accordance with the di-
rections of the owner ; but he cannot recover 
where the owner stipulates that the plan should 
be for a building not to cost over a specified 
~unount, if the plans made are for .a building ex-
ceeding that su1n. If the cost of erecting a build-
ing- is "reasonably near" or "reasonably approxi-
Inates" (as son1e of the authorities express it) 
that stated in the esti1nate or understanding of 
the parties, the owner might very properly be 
held liable, certainly in many cases, for he knows 
or as a man of ordinary intelligence may be pre-
sumed to know, that there 1nay be some slight 
variance between the estilna te and the actual cost 
of the building. Feltham v. Sharp, 99 G. 260, 
25 S. E. 619; Nelson v. Spooner, 2 Foster & Finla-
son, 613; Walt on Eng. and Arch. Juris., Supra. 
Ordinarily that question should be submitted to 
the jury, unless there be a written contract which 
has to be entirely construed by the court and has 
no provision in it which should be submitted to 
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the jury; but in a case like this, 'vhere it was con-
tended that the building to be erected was not 
to exceed $90,000, while the lowest bid was $125,-
000, the court could declare as a matter· of la\v 
that the estimate did not reasonably approxilnate 
the cost, which the lo\ver court in effect did in 
granting the defendant's first and third prayers. 
In addition to the authorities above referred to, 
· see 2 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, -818, Maack v. 
Schneider, 57 1Io. App. 431, W ees v. W.arren, 
72 1io. App. 644, Ada St. ~I. E. Church v. Garn-
sey, 66 Ill. 132, I-!all v. Los Angeles Co., 74 Cal. 
502, 16 Pac. _313, Smith v. Dickey, 7 4 Tex. 61, 
11 · S .. \V. 1049, and 1 IIudson on Bldg. 70, al-. 
tho_ugh so1ne of them do not discuss the question 
fully." · 
Za1i.Jiotlv v. Booth Rad·io Stations, 5~ X. ,-v. (2d) 
678~ .(Mich. -1952) previously referred to \\Tith relation 
.• . 
to quantum 1neruit, is particularly pertinent in that the 
contract is identical to the one in the in~tant ease. The 
circu1nstanees are equally identical in that the \vritten 
elernents of the contract \vere signed after the architect 
had begun his work. In this case the eourt denied re · 
co very on the con tract, der laring: On pg. 683, Notes 5 
and 6 
"Plaintiff having bre.aehed the contract as 
hereafter will be sho,vn, and defendant -receiv-
ing no benefit 'vhatsoever fron1 Plaintiff's per-
forinance thereof after Septe1nber 1~t by reason 
of. such breach, quanttun n)eruit is not proper. 
Recovery cannot be had on a quantum n1eruit by 
a person \Vho breaehed the rontr.act against one 
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reeeiving no benefit from the performance o'f the 
services for which recovery is sought. The trial 
court did not err. 
The trial court also ruled that Plaintiff had 
breached the contract and could recover nothing 
thereon by reason of his exceeding the cost limita-
tion on the building." 
lVetzel v. Roberts 295 N. \V. 580 (Mich. 1941) deal-
Ing \vith the same type of contract and circumstances 
resulting fro1n a bid in excess of the oral limitation, 
calls attention to the fact that no contract for the con-
struction of the building was ever executed and denied 
recovery to the architect, declaring: 
"In spite of obscurity and contradiction, it 
.appears that the architect's fees are based upon 
a percentage, to be computed upon the cost of 
the work and the cost of the work is to be based 
on the amount specified in the executed construc-
tion contract. 
In this case no contract for the construction 
\vork \vas ever executed. When Roberts received 
the bid on the plans prepared by plaintiff, it 
amounted to $28,000. This was so much greater 
than the amount that he had planned upon, and 
so in excess of the lilnitation of expense which 
was co1nmunicated by Heartt to Wetzel, that 
Roberts refused to go ahead with the proposition. 
1-Le later remodeled the building according to an-
other plan. Plaintiff sued for· 6 per cent of a fee 
based upon 10 per cent of the bid of $28,000 clailn-
ing that such sum w-as due him under the con-
tract. 
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·(l) There is nothing in the terms of the con-· 
tract which provides that the total fee of the 
architect would be 10 per cent of the amount 
of a bid. The .fee depends upon the letting of 
a contract. The architectural fees were based 
upon the total amount that it would cost to do 
the work, according to the terms of the construc-
tion contract. Apparently the form of contract 
here used was drafted to cover a case where the 
owner actually let a building contract; but it did 
not cover the case before u~, where no building 
contract was ever executed. To sustain the clann 
of plaintiff it would be necessary to hold that no 
· matter how. large. the bid for doing the work, 
Roberts would have been obligated to pay an 
architectural fee based upon the amount of such 
a ·bid. The contract does not so provide, and 
Roberts did not so agree. 
(2) Furthermore, it appears that there was 
an oral condition precedent to the execution of 
the contract. Plaintiff had been advised before 
he com1nenced to prepare the plans and specifica-
tions that the cost of the ilnprove1nents 'vas not 
to exceed $15,000. In this regard it is of no con-
sequence 'vhether Heartt, 'Yho infor1ned Wetzel 
of this lhnitation, 'vas the agent of· plaintiff or 
of Roberts. The evidence shows that, after being 
advised of the lhnitation, plaintiff drafted the 
plans and that there "Tas no subsequent modifica-
tion of this condition precedent. 
We cite additionally TV·icks v. i.1lu rphy, 54_ N. ''r· 
(2d) 850, and The Royal Order of Moose v. Faulhaber, 
41. N. W. (2d) 535, both recPnt Michigan c.ases and ''re 
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earnestly request their reading by the court in that the 
entire opinion deals probatively with the la'v subject, 
but are too long to repeat here. 
The citation of 127 ALR, 4-10 covers comprehensively 
the entire subject citing n1any 1nore cases dealing with 
the subject and revealing overvvheln1ingly the foregoing 
to be the general tenor of opinion. 
In the case .at bar the court, however, interjected 
the concept that the architect had avoided the onus of 
his failure to perform the contract by being ready, will-
ing and able to cut plans to the agreed figure. The only 
support appellant can find for this doctrine is the last 
sentence in Section 15 of Architects at 3 Am. J ur. 1009 :. 
"A similar rule applies where the architect 
is able and willing to make such alterations, but 
the en1ployer refuses to allow him to do so." 
The citation given in support of it is the hereinbefore 
cited Coo1nbs v. Beede, 89 ~fe. 187; 36 A. 104; 56 An1. 
St. Rep. 406: 
"Plaintiff, architect employed by defendant 
to build a house for $1500.00. The \vife wanted a 
second story and $2500.00 was set as limit, based 
on architect's actual estilnates. He then dre\v 
plans and then said he thought house would cost 
over $2500.00 and wife said cut it down. It was 
so done. 
"Bids were sent out and ranged from $3300.00 
to $4400.00 and then to $3100.00. Defendant re-
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fused to accept and refused to pern1it plaintiff to 
cut down plans. Plaintiff advised wait until 
spring and she accepted the advice, for building 
costs to come down. 
"Defendant did not wait, he bought his o'vn 
material and hired labor by the day, from 1nemory 
and experience drew sketch for carpenter and 
with him erected house and stable, substantially 
as plans. The house alone for a little less than 
$2700.00. 
"So that plaintiff's calculations tested by 
actual cost instead of contractor's bids were less 
than $200.00 of variance fro1n the standard "rhich 
·the. defendant and wife pretend was prescribed 
for by them. Even if A's version be true, then the 
undertaking of plaintiff was to make plans for a 
house to cost $2500.00 and no n1ore: and if acting 
in good faith, he exercised his skill and ability 
in an endeavor to bring about that result, that is 
all that could be -expected or required of hnn: 
and no defense is established against his clann 
even if he failed in his atte1npt. But if the house 
designed by hin1 could be built for less than $2,-
700.00 it could hardly be call~d a failure, espe-
cially in view of the interferences on the part 
of defendant's 'vife ~ nor a f.ailure if the plain-
tiff could have so altered his plans as to reduce 
the house in price, and it seems preposterous to 
say that he could not: and he was "illing to 1nake 
alterations, and the defendant or his 'Yife 'vould 
not consent thereto.'' 
It is interesting to note that An1erican Jurisprudence 
1s the only ene:vrlopedic leg.al authorit~~ dignifying 
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Coontbs v. Beede in its text. 
]{eferenc-es to the case have been 1nade in notes and 
footnotes as follo,vs : 
~'42 LRA N.S. 127 Note: '"\Vhile the decision 
in Coo1nbs v. I~eede, 89 ~'le. 187, 36 Atl. 104, is 
correct upon the evidence in the case, the opinion 
leaves so1nething of clearness to be desired.' " 
"5 CJ 262 Footnote re this case says : 'But 
the decision in this case 1nay perhaps be sup-
ported on the ground th.at some use was made 
of the architect's plans or suggestions.' " 
.L~merican I..4aw Reports (companion piece to A1n . 
• J ur.) at 127 ALR 412 Col. 2 states: 
''Attention is called to Coombs v. Beede which 
appears out of harmony with the general rule.-
lt is submitted that the opinion in the above case 
leaves something of a clearness to be desired." 
The syllabus to the Am. Sts. Rep. citation of the case 
declares in effect that the reason for the decision is the 
house v.ras actually built for less than $200.00 in excess 
of the stipulated figure. 
Appellant cannot argue that Coombs v. Beede is not 
good law as related to its particular facts, but feels a 
significance in the fact that despite the numerous adjudi-
cations relative to architects' fees since Coombs v. 
Beede was reported in 1898, its doctrine has never to 
the kno,vledge of appellants' counsel been followed or 
even argued in support of its doctrine of tender of per-
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formance. 
Indeed, to apply it to the instant case \Vould be vio-
lative of the cardinal principles ernployed in construing 
contracts, for it would be permitting the unilateral dis-
cretion of the architect limited only by a cost figur~ 
to deterrnine the appearance, the size and the structure 
of the house regardless of the desires of the proposed 
owner. So arbitrary is such a concept that it destroys 
the element of rnutuality in contracts. 
To construe the c~ntract of the parties here to rnean 
that respondent .as an architect could approach a set of 
plans on a hit or miss basis until he n1et an agreed figure, 
with the unrestricted option to cut "There he will in size 
and quality, and that appellants conten1plated and agreed 
to such a contract with such a n1eaning is to violate an 
uncontrovertible principle of the law in that it introduces 
an optional performance on the part of the respondent. 
The law frowns on construing a contract to be an 
option where there is no clear intent of the parties to do 
so and particularly where such a construction would en-
tail no responsibility, but only benefit to one of the 
parties. 
Yet this is apparently the theory of the trial judge 
for in his sun1n1ation (R. 320, Ln. 23 and follo,ving): 
"'MR. ROSE: ~fay I ask a question, your 
Honor? 
''How about the element of his performance 
of contract-even if you "Trr~ to find $62,500 \vas 
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the lin1it, isn't there .a question as to 'vhether or 
not he had substantially performed, even if that 
"\Vas the limit~ 
~'T I-IE COlJRT : I do not think so. lJ nder ~~r r. 
Parrish's testin1ony, he figured that he would get 
the plans close enough to it, so a revision would 
bring it within that range, and he was stopped 
in his efforts. 
"His theory is supported by his testimony 
that he was stopped in his efforts at getting a 
ho1ne in the range of $60,000, bec.a.use they decided 
that they did not want to go through "\Vith it." 
In A1nerican Locomotive Co. v. Clve1nical Research 
Cor]J., 171 I~.,. (2cl) 115, (1954) the Court declares at l~age 
128: 
"This Court said in ~Iidland Linseed Prod-
ucts Co. v. Charles I~. Sargent Co., 6 Cir., 281 F. 
704, at page 708 - 'It is a canon of construction 
that courts will not destroy the mutual and recip-
rocal obligations of the contracting parties, .and 
suhstitute therefor an optional contract, unless 
the language used ilnperatively requires such 
construction.' " 
In Wilson & English Canst. Co. v. New York C. R. 
Co., 269 N.1~.S. 877 (1935 ), the Court declares as rules 
of construction : 
"(3) Words intended to exempt a party 
from liability because of its own fault are to be 
construed strictly against it. 
" ( 4) A contract "\vill not be so construed 
aR to put one party at the mercy of the other. 
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Gillet v. Bank of America, 160 N.Y. 549, 55 N.E. 
292." 
[J dy v. Jensen, 63 Utah 94; 222 Pac. 598 (1924 Utah) 
cites with approval Frick, J., in B'ltrt v. Stringfellou·, 
45 Utah 207, 143 Pac. 234 as follows: 
"In case parties have entered into a contrart 
and differ with regard to its Ineaning, and the 
terms .of the contract are doubtful or ambiguous, 
the first duty of the court is to ascertain the ac-
tual intention of the parties at the time the con-
tract was entered into. This intention 1nust be 
determined from the language used by the parties 
when applied to the subject-matter of the contract 
and the circumstances and conditions surrounding 
the parties. In arriving at a conclusion all the 
words and expressions used by the parties in the 
contract must be given full force and· effect, un-
less to do leads to an .absurdity or is contrary 
to the manifest purpose and intention of the 
parties." 
And again: 
"The best construction is that 'vhich is 1nade 
by viewing the subject of the contract, as the 1nass 
of mankind would view it; for it 1nay be safely 
assu1ned that such 'vas the aspect in which the 
parties themselves viewed it. A result thus ob-
tained is exactly what is obtained from the car-
dinal rule of .intention." Schuylkill, etc., Co. v. 
Moore, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 490. 
It would be establishing an absurdity to construe 
the contract between the parties in the instant case 
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so as to cornpel appellants to accept the end result of 
respondent's unilateral, successive efforts to cut plans 
to an agreed figure. Certainly the fact that appellants 
had consented to one effort cannot mean that they had 
cornn1itted thernselves to a course of continuous consents 
to continuing cutting. 
\\Thile the facts are not precisel~r in point, the la'v 
as stated in Vin,al v. Inhabitants, Etc. (:~I ass. 1919) 122 
N.E. 29% see1ns pertinent .and applicable: 
"It could not have been ruled as a matter of 
la\V that the plaintiff \VUS entitled to an oppor-
tunity to n1odify his plans to the end that the cost 
of the building might be brought within the speci-
fied arnount. It was an express terrn of his con-
tract-that the test of his right to receive conlpen-
s.ation should be bills received after advertise-
rnent." 
And we quote 6 C.J.S. 310 on the question of op-
portunity to perform: 
"\Vhere Plaintiff \vas to prepare plans for a 
building for which the construction bids were not 
to exceed a fixed arnount, and where bids received 
exceedPd that a1nount, Plaintiff was not entitled 
later to rnodify his plans and bring the cost \vi thin 
the limit." 
CONCLlTSION 
The rules of construction are applied to contracts 
only when there are obvious ambiguities and never when 
the contract is rlear in all its ter1ns. However, if \Ve \vere 
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to concede simply for the purpose of argument that there 
were any ambiguities in the contract, then there is 
nothing \vhich could conceivably be construed as requir-
ing appellants to accept the result of respondent's re-
peated efforts to change the plans and specifications. 
The prim.ary rnotivation in seeking an architect to 
design a home is that one may have a home to fit his own 
ideas of comfortable and contented living. It is essential-
ly the desires and the -wants of the 0\Yner that are to he 
incorporated in a ho1ne, and it is the responsibility of th~ 
architect to fulfill those desires and \v.ants. 
Here it is clear that the architect did so at the point 
.,vhere l1e sent the plans and specifications out for the 
first bids. It is also clear that he \Yas a\vare of a cost 
limitation because it is beyond the credibility of a reason-
able n1an ·to believe that an architect could be turned 
loose to design a hon1e "Tith no n1ore restriction than 
the respondent here clain1s and \Yithout a cost limitation. 
The authorities clearly establish the fact that the 
respondent, under the circumstances, owed to the appel-
lants high duty o~ trust and responsibility; that the re-
lationship between the parties \Yas such as to ilnpose 
upon the respondent a duty to keep the appellants fully 
infor1ned concerning his honest judg1nent as to cost, 
and the amount of bids received pursuant to the plans 
and specifications prep.ared by the respondent. 'Vhen 
bids "Tere received for the \York, and ""rere greatly in 
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excess of the arnount 'vhich respondent knew appellants 
·were 'villing and able to pay for the construction of the 
ho1ne in question, it becan1e his obligation to infor1n the 
appellants of the arnount of Ruch bjd or hids. 
\Vhen at the trial it heeante apparent that the re-
spondent could not recover under the agreement which 
had been entered into by respondent and· appellants it 
'vas rlearly error for the court to per1nit respondent to 
:.unend his pleadings in order to recover on the basis 
of quantum 1neruit for any work performed in the pre-
paration of the plans .and specifications. But assuming 
that the eourt 'vas clothed 'vith the authority to per1nit 
the case to proceed on the basis of a recovery on the 
theory of a quanturn meruit, we subn1it that there is no 
evidence in this record showing or purporting to show 
the value of ~espondent's services in the preparation of 
the plans and specific.a tions to the point whe~e he ack-
nowledges a cost limitation. 
The value of respondent's serv1ces was attempted 
to be fixed by the court on the basis of a percentage of 
the prestipulated liinitation cost of the work. 
"\V e subrnit that the appellants are entitled to a judg-
ment of this court reversing the decision of the lower 
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court with instruction to the lower court to enter judg-
ment against the respondent for the sum of $1300.00 
paid by appellants to respondent together with the legal 
rate of interest from the date of entry of such judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BERNARD L. ROSE, 
A. H. HOUGAARD 
Attorneys for Appellants 
405 Felt Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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